Involvements of major financial institutions in the recent financial crisis have generated renewed interests in fragilities of global financial networks among economists and regulatory authorities. In particular, one potential vulnerability of the financial networks is the "financial contagion" process in which insolvencies of individual entities propagate through the "web of dependencies" to affect the entire system. In this paper, we formalize a banking network model originally proposed by researchers from Bank of England and elsewhere that may be applicable to scenarios such as the OTC derivatives market, define a global stability measure for this model, and comprehensively evaluate the stability measure over more than 700,000 combinations of networks types and parameter combinations. Based on such comprehensive evaluations, we discuss some interesting implications of our evaluations of this stability measure, and derive topological properties and parameters combinations that may be used to flag the network as a possible fragile network.
Introduction
total inter-bank exposure of the banking network, respectively. Two types of banking networks are possible:
homogeneous network model: E and I are equally distributed between the nodes and the links, respectively, and heterogeneous network model: E and I may not be equally distributed between the nodes and the links, respectively.
For both types of networks, we define the following quantities:
• σ v denotes the share of the total external asset E for bank v ∈ V .
• γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the ratio of equity to asset.
• ι v = (v,u)∈F w(v, u) denotes the total interbank asset of bank v ∈ V .
• b v = (u,v)∈F w(u, v) denotes the total interbank borrowing of bank v ∈ V .
• e v = (b v − ι v ) + σ v E − v∈V (b v − ι v ) denotes the effective share of the total external asset E for bank v ∈ V .
• a v = e v + ι v denotes the total asset of bank v ∈ V .
• c v = γ a v denotes the net worth (equity) of bank v ∈ V .
Both homogeneous and heterogeneous network models are relevant in practice, and have been investigated by prior researchers. Calculations of these parameters for a simple 5-node banking network are shown in Section A in the appendix.
Initial insolvency via shocks
The initial insolvencies of a banking network at time t = 0 are caused by "shocks" received by a subset of banks. Such shocks can occur, for example, due to operational risks (e. g., frauds 2 ) or credit risks, and has the effect of reducing the external assets of a selected subset of banks. Mathematically, we are given the 2 Studies such as by Iyer and Peydro [34] show that fraud is an important cause of bank insolvency.
real number Φ ∈ (0, 1] > γ denoting the severity of the initial shock, and the effect of the initial shock is to simultaneously decrease the external assets of each shocked bank v from e v by s v = Φ e v , thereby reducing the net worth of v from its original value c v to its new value c v − s v . By the phrase "shocking mechanism", we refer to the rule that is used to select the initial subset of nodes to be shocked.
Insolvency propagation equation
The insolvencies are assumed to propagate in discrete time units, say t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . We add "(t)" to all relevant variables to indicate their dependences on time. A bank becomes insolvent if its modified net worth becomes negative, and such a bank is removed from the network in the next time step. Let V insolvent (t) ⊆ V be the set of banks that have become insolvent before time t. The insolvency of a bank at time t affects the equity of other banks in the network by the following discrete-time "insolvency propagation equation":
v∈V \V insolvent (t)
In the above equation, the term | c v (t)| in−degree (v, t) allows the loss of equity of an insolvent bank to be distributed equitably among its creditors that have not become insolvent yet, whereas the term b v in−degree (v, t) ensures that the total loss propagated cannot be more than the total interbank exposure of the insolvent bank. The
Insolvency propagation continues until no new bank becomes insolvent. A pseudo-code of the insolvency propagation method starting with the initial shock is shown in Fig. 1 .
Rationale for the network and insolvency propagation model
As several prior researchers such as [10, 23, 24] have commented:
"conceptual frameworks from the theory of weighted graphs with additional parameters may provide a powerful tool for analysis of banking network models".
Several parametric graph-theoretic models have been used by prior researchers in finance, economics and banking industry to study various properties and research questions involving banking systems [1, 10, 19, 20, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] , differing in the way edges are interpreted and additional parameters are used to characterize the contagion. As noted by researchers such as [10, 29] :
"the modelling challenge in studying banking networks lies not so much in analyzing a model that is flexible enough to represent all types of insolvency cascades, but in studying a model that can mimic the empirical properties of these different types of networks".
The insolvency propagation model formalized and evaluated in this paper using a mathematically precise abstraction is similar in spirit to the models used in [1, [10] [11] [12] 25] , and is represented by cascades of cash-flow insolvencies. As observed in [29] , OTC derivatives markets and similar other markets are prone to such type of cascades. In such markets parties deal directly with one another rather than passing through an exchange, and thus each party is subject to the risk that the other party does not fulfill its payment obligations. The following example from [29] illustrates chains of such interactions:
[29] "Consider two parties A and B, such that A has a receivable from party B upon the realization of some event. If B does not dispose of enough liquid reserves, it will default on the payment. Now consider that B has entered an off-setting contract with another party C, hedging its exposure to the random event. If C is cash-flow solvent, then the payment will flow through the intermediary B and reach A. However, if C is cash-flow insolvent and defaults, then the intermediary B might become cash-flow insolvent if it depends on receivables from C to meet its payment obligations to A".
The length of such chains of interactions in some OTC markets, like the credit default swap market, is significant [21, 22] , thereby increasing the probability of a cascade of cash-flow insolvencies [23] . As observed in [10] and elsewhere, a insolvency propagation model such as studied in this paper "conceptualises the main characteristics of a financial system using network theory by relating the cascading behavior of financial networks both to the local properties of the nodes and to the underlying topology of the network, allowing us to vary continuously the key parameters of the network".
Although the cascading effect studied is a simplified one, as noted by Haldane and May from Bank of England in their paper [1] :
"This is a deliberate oversimplification, aimed at a clearer understanding of how an initial failure can propagate shocks throughout the system".
The global stability measure
Consider a banking network with all parameters as described before, and let 0 < K ≤ 1 be a real number denoting the fraction of nodes in V that received the initial shock under a shocking mechanism Υ. The vulnerability index of the network is then defined as
For example, ξ (0.1, G, 0.3, 0.5, Υ) = 0.9 means it is possible to make 90% nodes of the network G become insolvent with γ = 0.3 and Φ = 0.5 if we provide an initial shock to a suitably selected subset of 10% of nodes of G under the shocking mechanism Υ. Note that lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network. For simplicity, we will omit the arguments of ξ when they are clear from the context.
3.6
Rationale for the global stability measure
Network topology generation
We consider two topology models previously used by economists to generate random banking networks:
• the directed scale-free (SF) network [33] that has been used by prior banking network researchers such as [29, 30, 35, 36] , and
• the directed Erdös-Rényi (ER) network [41] that has been used by prior banking network researchers such as [11, [37] [38] [39] [40] .
The directed scale-free networks in this paper are generated using the algorithm outlined by Bollobas et al. [41] . The graph grows by adding single edges at discrete time steps. Let α, β, η, δ in (in-degree) and δ out (out-degree) be non-negative real numbers with α + β + η = 1. The initial graph G(0) at time t = 0 has just one node with no edges. At any time t the graph G(t) has exactly t edges, and a random number n(t) of nodes. For t > 0, the graph G(t + 1) is obtained from the graph G(t) by using the following rules:
• With probability α, add a new node v together with an edge from v to an existing node w, where w is chosen randomly such that Pr[w = u] = (din(u)+δin) (t+δinn(t)) for every existing node u, where d in (u) is the in-degree of node u in G(t).
• With probability β, add an edge from an existing node v to an existing node w, where v and w are chosen independently, such that
for every existing node u
(t+δinn(t)) for every existing node u with d out (u) being the out-degree of node u in G(t).
• With probability η, add a new node w and an edge from an existing node v to w, where v is chosen such that Pr[v = u] = (dout(u)+δout) (t+δoutn(t)) for every existing node u.
To study the affect of connectivity on network stability, we generated random SF and ER networks with average degrees of 3 and 6. In addition, to study the effect of sparse hierarchical topology of networks on its stability, we used the Barábasi-Albert preferential-attachment SF model [33] to generate random inarborescence networks. In-arborescences are directed rooted trees with all edges oriented towards the root, and have the following well-known topological properties:
• They belong to the class of sparsest connected directed acyclic graphs.
• They are hierarchical networks, i. e., the nodes can be partitioned into levels L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L p such that L 1 has exactly one node (the "root") and nodes in any level L i have directed edges only nodes in level L i−1 (see Fig. 2 ). In particular, the root models a "central bank" that only lends money to other banks but does not borrow money from any bank.
A random in-arborescence network of n nodes is generated using Barábasi-Albert preferential-attachment model [33] in the following manner:
• Start with one node as the root of the tree.
• At every successive time step, add a new node to the tree, and add an undirected edge from the new node to a randomly selected node u that is already in the tree. Node u is selected such that
w degree(w) , where degree(y) denotes the degree of node y. Increment the degree of node u and the new node. Repeat this step till the tree has n nodes.
• Orient all the edges towards the root.
The minimum difference between two non-identical values of the average vulnerability index over 10 runs for two n-node networks is 1 /(10 n). Thus, to allow for minor statistical biases introduced by any random graph generation method, we consider two vulnerability indices to be same (within the margin of statistical error) if their absolute difference is no more than 1 /(3 n), which is above 1 /(10 n) but no more than 0.7% of the total range of the vulnerability indices. For example, if ξ 1 and ξ 2 are the average vulnerability indices (over 10 runs) of two 50-node networks then we consider ξ 1 to be at least ξ 2 if ξ 1 > ξ 2 − 0.0066, and consider ξ 1 to be the same as ξ 2 if ξ 1 − ξ 2 ≤ 0.0066.
Shocking mechanisms Υ
We used the following two mechanisms to select the nodes to receive the initial shock:
Idiosyncratic (random) shocks: We select a subset of nodes uniformly at random. This corresponds to the case of random idiosyncratic initial insolvencies of banks, and is a choice that has been used by prior researchers such as [10, 25] .
Coordinated shocks: In this type of non-idiosyncratic correlated shocking mechanism, we seek to play an adversarial role in selecting a subset of nodes for the initial shock that may contribute more damage to the stability of the network 3 .
For homogeneous networks, all banks have the same share of the total external asset E. However, note the total interbank exposure b v of a bank v is directly proportional to the in-degree of the corresponding node v, and, as Equation (1) also suggests, nodes with higher inter-bank exposures are the banks that are more likely to transmit the shock to a larger number of other banks.
Thus, we play an adversarial role by selecting a set of κ|V | nodes in non-increasing order of their in-degrees starting from a node with the highest in-degree.
For heterogeneous networks, nodes with higher "weighted" in-degrees (i. e., higher values of the sum of the weights of incoming edges) represent banks that are larger than other banks in terms of their external assets, and have more inter-bank exposures. Thus, for heterogeneous networks, we play an adversarial role by selecting κ|V | nodes in non-increasing order of their weighted in-degrees starting from a node with the highest weighted in-degree.
The coordinated shocking mechanism falls under the general category of non-idiosyncratic correlated shocks where the nodes with high in-degrees or high weighted in-degrees are correlated.
Parameter spaces

Homogeneous networks
For homogeneous networks, all combinations of the following range of parameters were explored exhaustively:
3 See, for example [42] , about the role of adversarial strategies in measuring the worst-case bounds for network properties.
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• |V | = 50, 100, 300 ;
• E /I = 0.25, 0. • Φ = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 ;
• γ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, . . . , Φ − 0.05 ; and
• K = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9.
Thus, we explored a total of 24,570 combinations of parameters for each of the 2 types of shocks (idiosyncratic or coordinated) for each of the 5 network models (in-arborescence, ER of average degree 3, ER of average degree 6, SF of average degree 3 or SF of average degree 6), resulting in 245,700 different homogeneous banking networks. To correct statistical biases, for each such combinations of parameters, shock types and network types, we generated 10 corresponding random networks and computed the average value of the vulnerability index over these 10 runs. For generation of ER and SF random networks, we selected the values of network generation parameters such that the expected number of edges of the network is 3|V | or 6|V | based on whether we require the average degree of the network to be 3 or 6, respectively.
Heterogeneous networks
Recall that in a heterogeneous network it is possible to have a few banks whose external assets or interbank exposures are significantly larger than the rest of the banks in the networks, i. e., it is possible to have a few banks that are "too big", and thus heterogeneous networks permit investigation of the effect of such big banks on the global stability of the entire network.
To this end, we define a (α, β)-heterogeneous network G = (V, F ) as one in which we select a random subset V ′ of α|V | nodes and distribute βE part of the total external asset E equally among these nodes in V ′ . Let F ′ be the edges involving these α|V | nodes (i. e., edges in F ′ have at least one end-point from V ′ ).
Then we distribute βI part of the total interbank exposure I equally among a random subset of α|F ′ | of edges from the edges in F ′ . The remaining parts of E and I, namely (1 − β)E and (1 − β)I respectively, are distributed equally among the remaining (1 − α)|V | nodes and remaining |F | − β|F ′ | edges, respectively.
We performed our simulations for (α, β)-heterogeneous networks for two pairs of α and β, namely (α, β) = (0.1, 0.95) and (α, β) = (0.2, 0.6), thus we obtained a total of 491,400 different heterogeneous banking networks. The combination (α, β) = (0.1, 0.95) corresponds to the extreme situation in which 95%
of the assets and exposures involve 10% of banks, thus creating a minority of banks that are significantly larger than the remaining banks. The other combination (α, β) = (0.2, 0.6) corresponds to a less extreme situation in which there are a larger number of moderately large banks. Relevant data of all networks used in this paper will be made publicly available in the final version of the paper.
Results and discussion
4.1 Effect of unequal distribution of assets
On global stability
We comprehensively compared the values of the vulnerability index ξ for homogeneous and heterogeneous networks of same types and same values of common global parameters. For this purpose, for the same value of the common parameters |V |, E, κ, Φ and γ, for the same for network type (ER, SF or in-arborescence) of same average degree (6, 3 or 1) and for the same shocking mechanism Υ (coordinated or idiosyncratic), we compared the value of ξ for the homogeneous network with the corresponding values of ξ for both (0.1, 0.95)-heterogeneous and (0.2, 0.6)-heterogeneous networks. The comparison results are tabulated in Table 1 , where most of the entries are significantly higher than 50% (and in fact, are at least 90%). Thus, we conclude:
(A) networks where all banks have roughly the same external assets display higher global stability over similar networks in which fewer banks have a disproportionately higher external assets compared to the remaining banks.
On residual instability
For homogeneous networks, if the equity to asset ratio γ is close enough to the severity of the shock Φ then the network almost always tends to be perfectly stable, as one would intuitively expect. However, the above property is not true in general for highly heterogeneous networks in the sense that, even when γ is close to Φ, these networks (irrespective of their topologies and densities) have a minimum amount of global instability 4 . In Tables 4-13 we tabulate residual instabilities for different types of homogeneous and heterogeneous networks under coordinated and idiosyncratic shocks. The numbers in these tables show, for each combination of network types, |V |, shocking mechanism and values of Φ and γ such that |Φ − γ| = 0.05, the percentage of networks with this combination for which the vulnerability index ξ was less than 0.05, 0.1 or 0.2. As the reader will observe, all the numbers for heterogeneous networks are significantly lower than their homogeneous counter-parts. Thus, we conclude:
(B) a heterogeneous network of any type and any density, in contrast to its corresponding homogeneous version, has a non-trivial minimum global instability even if its equity to asset ratio is very large and close to the severity of the shock.
Effect of total external assets
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was enacted in USA to control speculation by banks by separating consumer banking and investment banking. Later, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 effectively removed this separation between investment and consumer banking, and subsequently in 2007 a collapse of major financial institutions was on the horizon. A controversial belief correlates these events by asserting that a repeal of Glass-Steagall act allowed a ripple effect of insolvencies of individual banks to many other banks in the network. In our setting, the quantity E /I controls the total (normalized) amount of external investments of all banks in the network. Thus, varying the ratio E /I allows us to investigate the role of the magnitude of total external investments on the stability of our banking network 5 . Our results are tabulated in Table 2 .
All the entries in Table 2 are vanishingly close to 0, showing that heterogeneous networks exhibited very small average changes in the vulnerability index ξ when E /I was varied. Thus, we conclude:
(C) for all heterogeneous banking networks under consideration, global stabilities are affected very little by the amount of total external assets in the system 6 .
Effect of network connectivity
Although it is clear that connectivity and other similar topological properties of a banking network should have a crucial effect on its stability, prior researchers have drawn mixed conclusions on this. For example, Allen and Gale [23] concluded that networks with less connectivity are more prone to contagion than networks with higher connectivity due to improved resilience of banking network topologies with higher connectivity via transfer of proportion of the losses in one bank's portfolio to more banks through interbank agreements.
On the other hand, Babus [17] observed that, when the network connectivity is higher, liquidity can be redistributed in the system to make the risk of contagion lower, and Gai and Kapadia [11] observed that higher connectivity among banks leads to more contagion effect during a crisis. The mixed conclusions arise because links between banks have conceptually two conflicting effects on contagion, namely,
• more interbank links may increase the opportunity for spreading insolvencies to other banks, but
• more interbank links may also provide banks with a type of co-insurance against fluctuating liquidity flows.
As our findings show below, these two conflicting effects have different strengths in homogeneous versus highly heterogeneous networks, thus justifying the mixed conclusions of past researchers.
Recall that in a homogeneous network all banks have the same external asset. Table 14 shows sparser homogeneous networks with lower average degrees to be more stable for same values of other parameters.
Thus, we conclude: (D) for homogeneous networks, higher connectivity leads to lower stability.
In a heterogeneous network, there are banks that are "too big" in the sense that these banks have much larger external assets and inter-bank exposures compared to the remaining banks. Table 3 shows that for heterogeneous network models denser networks with higher average degree are more stable than the corresponding sparser networks of lower average degree for same values of other parameters, specially when the heterogeneity of the network is larger (i. e., when α = 0.1 and β = 0.95). Thus, we conclude: (E) for highly heterogeneous networks, higher connectivity leads to higher stability.
Correlated versus idiosyncratic shocks
For most parameter combinations, our results showed that coordinated shocks, which is a type of correlated shock, resulted in a insolvencies of higher number of nodes as opposed to idiosyncratic shocks for the same network with the same parameters, often by a factor of two or more. Statistics of relevant comparisons for various network type are shown in Table 15 . For example, Table 15 shows that for homogeneous 6 It may be tempting to provide an intuitive interpretation of this conclusion by trying to relate this lack of change of ξ with the term bv in−degree (v, t) of Equation (1) that bounds the total shock propagated between successive time steps. This explanation may not be fully correct for at least two reasons. Firstly, the above conclusion does not hold for homogeneous networks which also use Equation (1) for insolvency cascading. Secondly, in our simulations we have found this term to limit insolvency cascading only in a minority of cases.
in-arborescence networks the vulnerability index under coordinated shocks is at least as much as the vulnerability index under idiosyncratic shocks 84.62% of the time, and for (0.1, 0.95)-heterogeneous ER networks of average degree 6 the vulnerability index under coordinated shocks is at least as much as the vulnerability index under idiosyncratic shocks 98.99% of the time 7 . Thus, we conclude:
(F) correlated shocking mechanisms are more appropriate to measure the worst-case stability compared to idiosyncratic shocking mechanisms.
Phase transition properties of stability
Phase transitions are quite common when one studies various topological properties of graphs [43] . The vulnerability index ξ shows several sharp phase transitions 8 . Two such interesting cases are discussed below.
Dense homogeneous networks
Based on the behavior of ξ with respect to Φ − γ, we observe that, for smaller value of κ and for denser ER and SF networks under coordinated or idiosyncratic shocks, there is often a sharp decrease of stability when γ was decreased beyond a particular threshold value. For example, with Φ = 0.5 and K = 0.1, both 100 node dense (average degree 6) SF and ER homogeneous networks exhibited more than ninefold increase in ξ around γ = 0.15 and γ = 0.1, respectively 9 .
To investigate the extent of such a sharp decrease around a threshold value of γ in the range 0.05, 0. Table 16 shows, a significant majority of the entries for Φ ≤ 0.8 and κ ≤ 0.2 are 2 λ or more.
Homogeneous in-arborescence networks
Homogeneous in-arborescence networks under coordinated shocks (and to a lesser extent under idiosyncratic shocks) exhibited a sharp increase in stability as the ratio E /I of the total external asset to the total interbank exposure the system is increased beyond a particular threshold provided the equity to asset ratio γ was approximately 50% of the shock parameter Φ. For example 10 , for a 50-node homogeneous in-arborescence network under coordinated shock, ξ exhibited a sharp decrease from 0.76 to 0.18 for E /I ∈ 0.75, 1 , K = 0.1, Φ = 0.5 and γ = 0.25 = Φ /2. To investigate the extent of such a sharp decrease of ξ around a threshold value of E /I in the range 0.5, 1 with γ ≈ Φ /2, we computed, for each type of shocking mechanism, and for each values of the parameters n, Φ, γ ≈ Φ /2, and κ of the homogeneous in-arborescence network, the ratio [42] A. Borodin, R. El-Yaniv, Online Computation and Competitive Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 1998).
[43] B. Bollobás, Random Graphs (Cambridge University Press, Second edition, 2001).
In-arborescence ER average degree 3 ER average degree 6 SF average degree 3 SF average degree 6 Table 2 : Absolute values of the largest change of the vulnerability index ξ in the range 0.25 ≤ E /I ≤ 3.5.
Figure 2: An in-arborescence graph. (B) Table 3 : Effect of connectivity on the global stability under coordinated and idiosyncratic shocks for (A) (α, β)-heterogeneous ER and SF networks and (B) (α, β)-heterogeneous in-arborescence versus (α, β)-heterogeneous SF networks. The number (percentage) shown for a comparison of the type "network A versus network B" indicates the percentage of data points for which the stability of networks of type A was at least as much as that of networks of type B. Table 4 : Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2. Table 5 : Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under idiosyncratic shocks. The percentages shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2. Table 6 : Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2. Table 7 : Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2. Table 9 : Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
idiosyncratic shock Φ = 0.6, γ = 0.55 Φ = 0.6, γ = 0.50 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 Table 12 : Residual instabilities of homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks under coordinated shocks. The percentages shown are the percentages of networks for which ξ < 0.05 or ξ < 0.1 or ξ < 0.2.
idiosyncratic shock Φ = 0.9, γ = 0.85 Φ = 0.9, γ = 0.80 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 ξ < 0.05 ξ < 0.1 ξ < 0.2 (α, β)-heterogeneous networks In-arborescence ER average degree 3 ER average degree 6 SF average degree 3 SF average degree 6 α = 0.1 ER average degree 6 SF average degree 6 ER average degree 6 SF average degree 6 
n = number of nodes = 5 m = number of edges = 7 γ = 0.1 I = total inter-bank exposure = m = 7 E = total external asset = 2I = 14 •
• ι v1 = ι v2 = ι v4 = 1, ι v3 = ι v5 = 2.
•
• c v1 = γ a v1 = 0.48, c v2 = γ a v2 = 0.38, c v3 = γ a v3 = 0.38, c v4 = γ a v4 = 0.58, c v5 = γ a v5 = 0.28.
(b) Heterogeneous version of the network
Suppose that 95% of E is distributed (equally) on the two banks v 1 and v 2 , and the rest 5% of E is distributed (equally) on the remaining three banks. Thus:
Suppose that 95% of I is distributed (equally) on the three edges
, and the remaining 5% of I is distributed (equally) on the remaining four edges
for bank v 1 :
Supplementary color figures S1-S11 ER model (average degree 6), coordinated shock ER model (average degree 3), coordinated shock ER model (average degree 6), idiosyncratic shock ER model (average degree 3), idiosyncratic shock SF model (average degree 6), coordinated shock SF model (average degree 3), coordinated shock SF model (average degree 6), idiosyncratic shock SF model (average degree 3), idiosyncratic shock in-arborescence (average degree ≈ 1), coordinated shock in-arborescence (average degree ≈ 1), idiosyncratic shock Figure S11: (drawn in color) Effect of variations of the total external to internal asset ratio E /I on the vulnerability index ξ for (α, β)-heterogeneous networks. Lower values of ξ imply higher global stability of a network.
